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Abstract
The Paris Agreement does not only stipulate to limit the global average temperature increase to
well below 2 ◦C, it also calls for ‘making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low
greenhouse gas emissions’. Consequently, there is an urgent need to understand the implications of
climate targets for energy systems and quantify the associated investment requirements in the
coming decade. A meaningful analysis must however consider the near-term mitigation
requirements to avoid the overshoot of a temperature goal. It must also include the recently
observed fast technological progress in key mitigation options. Here, we use a new and unique
scenario ensemble that limit peak warming by construction and that stems from seven up-to-date
integrated assessment models. This allows us to study the near-term implications of different limits
to peak temperature increase under a consistent and up-to-date set of assumptions. We find that
ambitious immediate action allows for limiting median warming outcomes to well below 2 ◦C in
all models. By contrast, current nationally determined contributions for 2030 would add around
0.2 ◦C of peak warming, leading to an unavoidable transgression of 1.5 ◦C in all models, and 2 ◦C
in some. In contrast to the incremental changes as foreseen by current plans, ambitious peak
warming targets require decisive emission cuts until 2030, with the most substantial contribution
to decarbonization coming from the power sector. Therefore, investments into low-carbon power
generation need to increase beyond current levels to meet the Paris goals, especially for solar and
wind technologies and related system enhancements for electricity transmission,
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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distribution and storage. Estimates on absolute investment levels, up-scaling of other
low-carbon power generation technologies and investment shares in less ambitious
scenarios vary considerably across models. In scenarios limiting peak warming to below
2 ◦C, while coal is phased out quickly, oil and gas are still being used significantly until
2030, albeit at lower than current levels. This requires continued investments into existing
oil and gas infrastructure, but investments into new fields in such scenarios might not be
needed. The results show that credible and effective policy action is essential for ensuring
efficient allocation of investments aligned with medium-term climate targets.
1. Introduction
1.1. Context
The Paris Agreement aims to hold the increase in
global average temperature well below 2 ◦C and to
pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5 ◦C. It also calls for
finance flows to be consistent with these global goals.
While 1.5 ◦C and 2 ◦C goals are to be met by 2100,
the 2020s have been identified as the decisive decade
for achieving them. The next decade is indeed crucial
as any delay in climate action can stimulate the con-
struction and lock-in of additional carbon-intensive
energy technologies, leading to an overshoot of the
1.5 ◦C goal while rendering the transition to a low-
carbon system more difficult (Tong et al 2019).
In this context, scenario ensembles are an import-
ant tool for understanding, in a systematic fashion,
the implications of climate goals and delayed cli-
mate action for the future development of the energy
system and the associated investment needs. How-
ever, a sound and policy-relevant analysis cannot only
rely on a transparent forward-looking approach like
integrated assessment models (IAMs) but must also
consider the latest available information on techno-
economic developments (e.g. current and future anti-
cipated capital costs of mitigation technologies) and
policy data (e.g. NDCs) at the global and national
levels (Schaeffer et al 2020). In addition, scenario
data must reflect current real-world dynamics in the
short-term. This is all the more important as scenario
data are increasingly used to assess the financial risks
of the low carbon transition and the level of align-
ment of investment portfolios with temperature tar-
gets (Weber et al 2018, NGFS 2021).
1.2. Current knowledge
Previous research has investigated in detail the
implications of current country policies and pledges
(Vrontisi et al 2018, Roelfsema et al 2020), medium-
term decarbonization requirements (Luderer et al
2018) and energy investment needs for different long-
term climate targets (McCollum et al 2013, 2018,
Kober et al 2016). The latter revealed that overall
energy investments over the next three decades need
to be scaled up to reach an end-of-century target of
2 ◦C and that investments need to shift from fossil to
low-carbon energies and energy efficiency.
However, these past modelling studies have been
criticized for their lack of realistic near-term projec-
tions, in particular insufficient reflection of current
trends of increasing deployment of renewable tech-
nologies and declining costs (Creutzig et al 2017), and
underestimation of the growth potential of granular
or small-scale technologies like solar, wind, batteries
and electric cars in the near-term (Sweerts et al 2020,
Wilson et al 2020). They have also been singled out for
their extensive use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR)
options in the long-term, like bioenergy with car-
bon capture and storage and afforestation (Anderson
and Peters 2016). These technological solutions allow
compensation of temporary temperature overshoots
by net-negative emissions in the last decades of the
21st century, and the assumption about their long-
term availability influences the required level of near-
term ambition (Kriegler et al 2018, Hilaire et al 2019).
While these technologies could materialize in the
future, alternatives might be more attractive as pre-
vious studies point to the land requirements for some
of these options or the lack of current progress on key
technologies (Smith et al 2016, Fuss et al 2018). Fur-
thermore, the economic climate damages associated
with a temporary overshoot of temperature targets
and high temperature gradients (McKenna et al 2020)
have not been considered in models (Schultes et al
submitted). To address these concerns, a new scen-
ario designwith an explicit definition of net-zeroCO2
budgets (i.e. with a bound on cumulative emissions
until reaching net-zero CO2 emissions) has been pro-
posed (Rogelj et al 2019), structurally disentangling
the near-term question of limiting peak temperature
with the longer-termquestionwhether or not to bring
down temperatures strongly afterwards via CDR
and thus allowing for a more comprehensive set of
scenarios.
Moreover, the scientific evidence on how current
and planned investments in the energy system align
with the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement
and how they should develop over the next few dec-
ades remains scarce. The latest IPCC assessment on
1.5 ◦C noted that the literature on the subject is ‘relat-
ively sparse’ and focuses primarily on 2 ◦C pathways.
1.3. Our contribution
Here we present a new detailed analysis of the implic-
ations of peak-warming targets (using net-zero CO2
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budgets as proxies) for the energy system up to
the year 2030. We use a scenario set that spans a
wide range of peak temperature targets including
1.5 ◦C–2 ◦C. This allows us to more finely assess
the impact of delayed climate action and estab-
lish a clear connection between near-term energy
investment requirements and peak warming con-
sequences. Furthermore, our study is based on an
updated set of policy, socio-economics and techno-
economic assumptions and revised model versions.
The models have been subject to a thorough vetting
of current developments of key technologies, espe-
cially solar and wind. This enables us to clarify some
ambiguities regarding technology priorities in earlier
studies (McCollum et al 2018). The increased tech-
nology resolution in the presentation of results fur-
thermore allows for differentiating betweenmore and
less robust results regarding technology choice across
models.
This article focuses primarily onnear-term energy
system developments and investments. Other art-
icles from the same study (‘ENGAGE’) and based
on the same scenario dataset analyse implications
for the land-use system (Hasegawa et al submit-
ted), the macro-economic mitigation costs of limit-
ing warming to different levels (either via net-zero
or end-of-century CO2 budgets) and requirements
for net-zero energy systems (Riahi et al submitted)
and unavoidable residual damages at different peak
warming levels (Drouet et al submitted).
2. Methods
The following paragraphs provide a short overview
of the scenario design, the models, their calibration
and the vetting of near-term developments, and the
analysis and comparative data. More details on each
of these topics can be found in the supplementary
material.
2.1. Scenarios
This study is based on a harmonized ensemble
of scenarios from seven IAMs: GEM-E3, IMAGE,
MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM, POLES, REMIND-
MAgPIE, TIAM-ECN, and WITCH. The scenario set
includes two prospective scenarios, extrapolating the
implied ambition levels of current policies (‘NPi’, for
‘implemented national policies’), and those of NDC
targets for 2030 (‘NDC’) without explicit medium-
or long-term targets. Additionally, two sets of scen-
arios explore a range of net-zero CO2 budget scen-
arios, ranging from 400 to 3000 Gt CO2, measured
from 2018 until the year of net-zero CO2 emissions.
Non-CO2 greenhouse gases in these scenarios are
priced equivalently to the implied CO2 prices, using
100 years global warming potentials for conversion.
The 1st set explores ‘immediate’ policy action after
2020, while the 2nd set of ‘delayed’ scenarios fol-
lows the trajectory of the NDC-extrapolated scenario
until 2030, and only after that shifts to comprehens-
ive policies towards the peak-budget target (without
anticipation before). After reaching net-zero CO2
emissions, total CO2 emissions are kept net-zero, with
a tolerance of±0.2 Gt CO2. Unlike companion stud-
ies (Drouet et al submitted, Riahi et al submitted),
we focus here exclusively on scenarios with a net-zero
budget formulation. Figure 2(a) includes a compar-
ison of five additional scenarios using the end-of-
century budget definition (further explored in Riahi
et al submitted), with the net-zero budget scenarios
and shows the equivalence of both scenario sets for
the question explored here.
The scenarios are all calibrated to a middle-
of-the-road SSP2 socio-economic baseline regard-
ing GDP and population developments (Fricko et al
2017). The COVID-19 crisis and the related drop
in GDP, energy demand and CO2 emissions are
not included in the default model runs. The dir-
ect CO2 reduction impact of the COVID-19 crisis
in 2020 (Le Quéré et al 2020) is small compared to
the 400–3000 Gt CO2 budgets used in this paper.
The potential implications of the secondary impacts
of COVID-19 on the development of the economy
and investments (Andrijevic et al 2020, Cherp and
Jewell 2020) are qualitatively discussed in the dis-
cussion section, based on recent literature and addi-
tional sensitivity scenarios assuming a lower near-
term GDP trajectory as a result of COVID-19 (see
supplementary figures S13 and S14 (available online
at stacks.iop.org/ERL/16/074020/mmedia)).
2.2. Models and scenario vetting
This study uses seven global IAMs, all of which have
previously been documented and discussed in the
literature, and most of which have openly available
source code. The scenarios from all models were thor-
oughly scrutinized with respect to recent trends up to
2019 of deployment levels of key energy technologies
(BP 2020) and their cost assumptions, especially for
those with rapidly falling costs such as solar photo-
voltaics, wind (IEA 2020b). Furthermore, near-term
deployment until 2030 was reviewed for technologies
with long construction and planning lead-times like
nuclear and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS)
to avoid unrealistic capacity expansion beyond exist-
ing plans and proposals (World Nuclear Association
2020).
2.3. Analysis and historical data
The analysis here relies primarily on explicitly rep-
resented variables in the models. An exception is
global mean temperature, which has been calcu-
lated using a harmonized version of the reduced-
complexity climate model emulator MAGICC, ver-
sion 6.0 (Meinshausen et al 2011). Furthermore, some
of the investment variables are not explicitly rep-
resented in some of the models. For models not
representing investments into fossil fuel extraction
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Figure 1. Relationship between peak warming and net-zero CO2 budgets (a), and carbon prices 10 years after the introduction of
comprehensive climate policies (i.e. in 2030 for immediate scenarios and 2040 for delayed scenarios) (b), for both immediate and
delayed scenarios. The green shadings illustrate the areas of budgets that are in line with a possible definition of ‘well below 2 ◦C’
(median peak warming <1.75 ◦C), and with a more stringent peak warming target compatible with achieving 1.5 ◦C with only
limited overshoot (median peak warming <1.55 ◦C).
or using different definitions, these have been estim-
ated by multiplying regional extraction (calculated as
the difference between primary energy usage and net
trade) by a constant investment intensity estimated
from IEA’s global investment and primary energy
data in 2019 (IEA 2020a). Investments into energy
efficiency have been derived from final energy sav-
ings for all models using the approach presented by
McCollum et al (2018). Several plots in the results
section compare scenario data with historical and
scenario data from the IEA and BP (BP 2020, IEA
2020a). All absolute investment numbers are given in
US$2010.
Most models run on 5 years time steps (except
TIAM-ECNwith 10 years time steps, and POLES and
IMAGE with annual time steps, though only 5 years
time steps are reported for these models). Most of the
analysis is presented in terms of 2030 values or aver-
age values for the periods 2025–2030. In most mod-
els, these time steps represent the years 2023–2032,
except for MESSAGE-GLOBIOM, where they repres-
ent the years 2021–2030. The choice of this temporal
focus depends on the fact that including the (fixed)
2020 time step into calculation of yearly average (e.g.
as would be done by calculating the 2020–2030 aver-
age from interpolated yearly data) would understate
the impact of scenario-specific policy choices, which
only materialize after the 2020 time step.
3. Results
3.1. Net-zero-budget determines peak-warming
Peak temperature correlates closely with the cumu-
lative CO2 budgets until CO2 emissions reach net-
zero. The relationship can be relatively well approx-
imated by a linear relationship, starting with 1.48 ◦C
of median peak warming for a 400 Gt CO2 net-zero
budget and increasing by 0.05 ◦C for each additional
100 Gt CO2 (figure 1(a)).
Peak temperatures for a given net-zero CO2
budget vary by less than ±0.13 ◦C, which mainly
comes from differences in non-CO2 greenhouse gas
emissions. To a lesser extent, differences are also due
to the different temporal profiles of CO2 emission
reductions, which influence the timing of peak CO2
forcing (see supplementary figure S1).
3.2. Impact of NDCs
In delayed scenarios, in which no strengthening of
ambition occurs before 2030, the feasibility fron-
tier of net-zero CO2 budgets (which corresponds to
the very steep negative slopes in figure 1(b)) shifts
towards higher values (see red arrow) and, con-
sequently, does the peak temperature. Furthermore,
achieving the same CO2 net-zero budgets after such
a delay in comprehensive mitigation leads to slightly
higher peak temperature outcomes, as peak CO2 for-
cing is reached earlier and at a higher level (given the
faster depletion of the budget). The forcing of the
relatively short-lived climate forcer CH4 is decreas-
ing (and dominates the slowly increasing forcing of
N2O). Earlier peak CO2 forcing results in earlier and
higher overall peak forcing (supplementary figure S1)
and temperature.
The high challenges of meeting low budget tar-
gets are reflected by the associated high carbon prices
required in both immediate and delayed policy cases.
Figure 1(b) shows the resulting trade-off curves of
the carbon price required 10 years after the introduc-
tion of ambitious, comprehensive policies (so in 2030
for immediate scenarios and 2040 for delayed scen-
arios). These are highly convex, indicating the escal-
ating costs for very low temperature and budget tar-
gets (Luderer et al 2013). The effect of delay is mostly
a shift of these curves to the right to higher budget val-
ues. The shift for allmodels lies within the 300–500Gt
range, translating into roughly 0.2 ◦C additional peak
warming achievable for the same carbon price efforts
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Figure 2. 2030 CO2 emissions and changes in energy and emissions intensity indicators from 2020 to 2030 in immediate net-zero
budget scenarios, as well as for the NDC and NPi scenarios. The dashed line denotes the estimated 2019 emissions (Friedlingstein
et al 2019) and the 2020 model value, respectively. Supplementary figure S2 shows that GDP growth, the missing component of
the commonly used Kaya decomposition of emission trends, differs slightly across scenarios.
in a delayed scenario. Therefore, the delay in all mod-
els makes peaking below 1.5 ◦C impossible, and for
some models, even limiting peaking to below 2 ◦C
with high likelihood becomes impossible at manage-
able carbon prices.
3.3. 2030 energy system transformation for
ambitious net-zero budgets
To reach ambitious net-zero budget targets cost-
efficiently, strengthening climate mitigation in 2030
is essential (figure 2(a)). For the 600 Gt CO2 net-
zero budget target, our analysis projects a range of
compatible 2030 CO2 emissions of 16–25 Gt CO2,
corresponding to a reduction of 42%–63% com-
pared to 2019 levels (Friedlingstein et al 2019).
These net-zero budget scenarios feature substan-
tially lower 2030 emission levels than 600 Gt CO2
end-of-century budget scenarios as used in previ-
ous studies (McCollum et al 2018), for which 2030
emissions are in a range of 21–31 Gt CO2, or a
28%–51% reduction relative to 2019. If, by contrast,
net-zero budget scenarios and end-of-century budget
scenarios are compared in terms of their net-zero
budgets, i.e. cumulative emissions until reaching net-
zero, their 2030 emissions are remarkably similar. In
other words, near-term actions are not affected by
what happens to emissions after they get to net-zero.
Independently on whether emissions stay at net-zero
(as done in the net-zero budget scenarios analysed
here) or reach considerable net-negative levels to
bring temperature down until 2100 (as in the end-of-
century budget sensitivity scenarios), investments of
the coming decade are not affected. Energy efficiency
improvements and demand reduction (figure 2(b)),
switches to inherently cleaner fuels, CDR, and the
decarbonization of different fuels all play a role in
this increased mitigation action. However, the decar-
bonization of electricity supply (figure 2(c)) stands
out across all models showing the highest response to
policy signals, contributing the most to overall mitig-
ation by 2030. The carbon intensity of power supply
drops to −80% compared to 2020 values in the most
ambitious scenarios in all but one model (see sup-
plementary section ‘model differences’ for explana-
tion). In contrast, the average carbon intensity of the
sum of all other fuels (solids, liquids, heat, gases, and
hydrogen) only varies around±10%of 2020 values in
most models and scenarios. Only a few models pro-
ject a reduction of up to−25% in the most ambitious
budget cases. One reason for this significant drop is
that the carbon intensity of power supply has already
been on a declining trend for the past years (Bertram
et al 2021) and is also projected to decrease further
with current policies, NDC targets or lenient net-zero
budget targets, though not nearly at the rate com-
patible with low net-zero budget targets. The recent
reductions in emission intensity of power generation
have been caused by rising installations of renewables,
mostly solar and wind, and a shift from coal to gas
power generation in OECD countries. Fast decarbon-
ization of power supply until 2030 is also an essential
step for overall mitigation. This is a prerequisite for
decarbonizing different demand sectors via electrific-
ation (Luderer et al 2018, Madeddu et al 2020) or the
provision of low-carbon electricity-based fuels like
hydrogen.
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Figure 3. Investment shares (bars), and share of total investments into non-fossil technologies (lines) for all 600 Gt net-zero
budget scenarios. See supplementary figure S3 for the figure with 1000 Gt net-zero budgets. Estimated average yearly investment
numbers for 2015–2020 from IEA (2020a). Other low-carbon fuels includes hydrogen and biomass investments.
3.4. Rapid investment shifts for 1.5 ◦C peak
warming
Limiting peak warming to close to 1.5 ◦C requires
a substantial increase in overall energy system
investments by 2030 compared to levels in recent
years. This net increase results from reduced invest-
ments into fossil extraction and increased invest-
ments into power systems, efficiency, and low-carbon
fuels (see figure 3 and supplementary figure S4).
While in the past 5 years (2015–2020) investments
into fossil extraction and power generation accoun-
ted for 50% of all energy-related investments, they
account for less than 20% by 2030 in scenarios with
a 600 Gt CO2 net-zero budget constraint. Con-
versely, investments into low-carbon power gener-
ation accounted for 15% recently but rise to more
than 30% by 2030, corresponding to a quadrupling
in absolute volumes. In later decades, the relat-
ive importance of low-carbon power generation
decreases again, as most of the growing investment
effort is directed to efficiency and low-carbon fuels
supply, including hydrogen. Although it is not sur-
prising to observe that the uncertainty of investment
shares increases further into the future, it is worth-
while to note that this is also the case for more lenient
climate targets (see supplementary figure S3).
The increase in overall investment volumes
required for ambitious temperature targets leads to
an increase in the share of energy investments in total
GDP from 3% to up to 5% in the coming decades.
In contrast, without ambitious policies, this share
would continuously decrease (see supplementary
figure S16). However, it is important to keep in mind
that increased investments in climate policy scen-
arios are partly offset by reduced fuel expenditures—
although this can vary significantly across regions and
is especially problematic for major fuel exporters.
3.5. 2030 investments for ambitious net-zero
budgets—low-carbon power generation
Deep decarbonization of the power supply for very
low carbon budgets requires a substantial increase in
the sector’s average annual investments in generation
capacity compared to historic levels, by up to a factor
of 3 for the total. Most low-carbon power genera-
tion technologies have relatively high capital costs and
moderate operation and maintenance costs. Hence,
upfront investment costs represent the lion’s share in
total electricity generation costs of these technolo-
gies. This is also why power sector investments dom-
inate total energy investments in the 1st decades of
very ambitious climate scenarios. These investments
both decarbonize the existing power system and lay
the foundation for later decarbonization of other sec-
tors via (direct or indirect) electrification.
Three components dominate the investments into
low-carbon power generation (figure 4): solar, wind,
and the investments for enabling the integration
of these technologies to the grid, primarily for the
expansion of grid infrastructure and electricity stor-
age; these three components also show the highest
response to decreasing budget targets, up to four
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Figure 4. Average yearly power sector investments by energy technology category (2025–2030), in immediate net-zero budget
scenarios, as well as the NDC and NPi scenarios. Other low-carbon includes nuclear, biomass, and hydro, plus geothermal and
ocean energy for those models that include these options (see supplementary figure S5 for the corresponding plot of these
individual options and supplementary figure S13 for a variant of this figure with additional sensitivity scenarios including a
COVID-19 shock on near-term GDP projections).
times the level in 2020 (which, given cost reduc-
tions implies an even stronger increase in capacity
additions for solar and wind, see also supplementary
figure S15). To balance intermittent supply fromwind
and solar with demand variation, both higher trans-
mission and increased electricity storage are required
for achieving high penetration rates of renewables.
While storage and grid expansion might partly sub-
stitute each other, their combined investments always
increase with higher target stringency. On the other
hand, solar and wind are good complements due to
their different diurnal and seasonal generation pro-
files, so that a balanced investment into both options
is a robust strategy.
Fossil-based power generation investments
decrease to very low levels for very stringent net-
zero budget targets. All pathways consistent with the
temperature goals of the Paris Agreement feature no
investments in new coal-fired power plants without
CCS. In contrast, gas power increases in most scen-
arios in fast-growing economies to compensate the
rapid phase out of coal-power generation and to act
as flexible peak capacity for variable renewables (sup-
plementary table S2).
Other low-carbon options (see supplement-
ary figure S5) include nuclear energy, hydropower,
biomass-based electricity generation, and for those
models representing it geothermal and ocean energy.
Due to more complex and longer planning times
(nuclear and hydro), context-specific supply chain
constraints (biomass), and decreasing competitive-
ness with solar andwind power, the upscaling of these
options for low carbon budgets is lower (Wilson et al
2020). Given that these options offer firm capacity,
they continue to attract investment despite being
more expensive (Sepulveda et al 2018). Thus, the
complementarities across technologies lead to a rel-
atively broad investment portfolio in all models and
diverging results on relative shares of individual tech-
nologies. Given the high uncertainty about future
costs and other characteristic of short and long-
term storage technologies (Sepulveda et al 2021), the
optimal investment levels into transmission and stor-
age vary even more strongly across models than the
investments into other technologies (see also section
‘model differences’ in the supplementary material).
3.6. 2030 investments for ambitious net-zero
budgets—efficiency and other low-carbon
solutions
Two other streams of investments are crucial for suc-
cessfully achieving ambitious net-zero budget targets:
firstly, investments into efficiency in all three end-
use sectors (transport, buildings and industry) are
crucial for limiting the growth in energy demand
and thus enabling economic prosperity for a grow-
ing global population within the boundaries of sus-
tainable energy supply. The investment requirements
are shown in figure 3 and supplementary figures S3
and S4 and are estimated using a simplemethodology
based on reductions of final energy demand com-
pared to a reference scenario and information on sup-
ply investments (McCollum et al 2018).
Secondly, although investments into low-carbon
fuels and CCS infrastructure are somewhat limited
in volumes compared to investments in low-carbon
7
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Figure 5. Average yearly investment in fossil extraction (2025–2030, (a)), and 2030 fossil fuel demand for oil (b), gas (c) and coal
(d). Fossil fuel extraction investments are using the self-reported values for WITCH for oil, for which historic numbers are
consistent with the IEA numbers used for comparison here. For other models and coal and gas, a simple estimation based on the
average 2015–2019 investment intensity of primary energy use, and the observed fuel use in scenarios is used, likely
overestimating investments for scenarios with declining demand. See supplementary material section ‘Estimating investment
data’ for details and supplementary figure S14 for a variant of this figure with additional sensitivity scenarios, including a
COVID-19 shock on near-term GDP projections.
power generation, these early investments into cur-
rently nascent technologies like hydrogen, synthetic
fuels, and advanced biofuels are essential as they rep-
resent crucial options for achieving net-zero targets in
hard-to-abate sectors (Detz et al 2018) such as high-
temperature industrial processes and transportation.
Therefore, investments in other low-carbon fuels,
including hydrogen and bioenergy with CCS, also
increase considerably in later decades (see figure 3 and
supplementary figures S3 and S10).
3.7. 2030 investments for ambitious net-zero
budgets—fossil fuels extraction
The results for investments into fossil fuel extrac-
tion consistently show a decline for lower budget
targets (figure 5(a)). The magnitude of this decline
in investments, however, is less clear than in the
power sector. This can partly be explained by a
much higher uncertainty about investment require-
ments for given energy demands, which reflect the
large technological differentiation of the fossil sup-
ply sector (ranging from conventional extraction
with much lower investment requirements than,
e.g. offshore oil). Results are much more consistent
for overall 2030 demands for different fossil fuels
(figures 5(b)–(d)). Coal faces a reduction of up to
two-thirds of 2019 levels. Reductions in oil and gas,
by contrast, are more limited even under the most
ambitious budget targets. This reflects their higher
specific economic value, lower emissions intens-
ity, and more difficult near-term substitutability,
which leads to lower reductions at a given carbon
price. Some of the lowest scenarios project 2030 oil
demands that are lower than the level of oil sup-
ply that, according to a recent detailed analysis, can
be achieved without investments into any new oil
fields (IEA 2020b). However, this level of supply
will still require continued investments into existing
fields.
4. Discussion
The results of this study provide an updated and
detailed perspective on the near-term energy sys-
tem changes and associated investments that are con-
sistent with the Paris Climate targets. They broadly
confirm high-level results related to investment shift
identified in similar earlier studies (Kober et al 2016,
McCollum et al 2018). Given a careful vetting of scen-
arios for recent developments, especially regarding
deployment and cost of low-carbon options, results
across models are more consistent than most of these
previous publications (for a discussion on model dif-
ferences, see supplementary section ‘model differ-
ences’). Thus, our study clarifies some of the previous
ambiguity and addresses identified inconsistencies of
previous scenarios, pointing out the crucial relevance
of early decarbonization of power generation, mainly
via a strong acceleration of solar and wind invest-
ments. The study also unpacks the temporal granu-
larity of these investments, with a stronger focus on
the near-term until 2030.
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4.1. COVID-19
The scenarios presented in this analysis do not take
the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting global
economic crisis into account. The time step ‘2020’ in
the models, as all time-steps representing a 5 years
period, is therefore calibrated to an energy system
configuration based on the expected pre-COVID
2020 values. Numbers related to 2020matchwell with
recent data for 2019, while obviously data on energy
use and emissions fail to reflect the reductions expec-
ted for 2020. More importantly, the 2025–2030 GDP
assumptions are based on SSP2 trajectories and do
not consider that the 2025 numbers might be lower
due to COVID. Though uncertainty remains very
high, five models ran additional sensitivity scenarios
to test the impact of lower near-term GDP assump-
tions (supplementary figures S13 and S14). The res-
ults show that if GDP levels in 2025 (and 2030) turn
out to be lower than assumed in the default scenario,
as currently projected by IMF (2020), overall energy
demand will also be lower. This results in slightly
lowered energy investment across all technologies in
the sensitivity scenarios. The effect on the power sec-
tor investment requirements for low net-zero budgets
is limited (supplementary figure S13). Given that
these investments also reflect the need for upscal-
ing the related technological options with a view to
longer-term net-zero energy systems, the investments
in these options are increasing with increasing policy
stringency, only slightly slower compared to scenarios
with default GDP assumption.
If mobilizing investments would become harder
due to a deepening economic crisis, this could
impact investments, especially for financially dis-
tressed countries and institutions (Cherp and Jewell
2020). However, it should be noted that recovery
investments are multiple times the volumes required
for decarbonization globally in the next few years
(Andrijevic et al 2020). A possible impact might be
more prominent for risky investments like nuclear,
large hydro and CCS than for solar and wind, for
which the business case will likely be more robust;
investments into these technologies also remained
robust in 2020 (Bloomberg 2020, IEA 2020b). On the
other hand, recovery programs might also support
the further build-up of high-emitting infrastructures
such as coal power plants, which would be a hurdle
for ambitious mitigation.
The outlook for fossil fuels and required resid-
ual investments for low budget targets could be more
strongly impacted by COVID-19, though the impact
of the GDP effect in the sensitivity scenarios is also
very limited (supplementary figure S14). Suppose
behavioural changes favour less business-related air
travel, and more home-based work remains partly in
place after the current crises. In that case, this could
lead to a decrease in oil demand beyond the pure
GDP effect considered in our sensitivity cases here.
This could imply that no new oil fields are required
for slightly higher targets, including the well-below
2 ◦C. In any case, the higher uncertainty regarding
future demand for oil and gas has already led to a shift
towards smaller, shorter-cycle investments in this sec-
tor (IEA 2020b).
4.2. Limitations
It is important to note that lower investments in low-
carbon fuels than low-carbon electricity do not imply
that these investments are less important. Given that
some sectors will not be able to be electrified directly,
it is crucial for the feasibility of net-zero energy sys-
tems that these options are scaled up. Low-carbon
energy carriers such as e-fuels (Detz et al 2018) may
well be needed in those sectors for which electrifica-
tion is either infeasible or too costly; early investments
will assist in stimulating learning phenomena that can
render these fuels cheaper in the future. Given their
earlier development stage and thus higher risks, they
will also require other forms of investments.
The methodology for estimating energy effi-
ciency investments does not allow for disaggregat-
ing investment requirements into different end-use
sectors. Therefore, both estimates for efficiency and
fuel extraction investments are less accurate than
the estimates on investment requirements for power
supply. The main issue is the inherent difficulty
in scoping, disentangling and measuring efficiency
effects and investments compared to investments into
demand-side equipment per se. Energy savings can
also be achieved through behavioural changes that
do not incur investments: the dominance of supply-
sidemeasures in investments thus does not imply that
supply-side solutions dominate the overall mitigation
effort.
The study mostly focused on investments and
did not cover the issue of overall mitigation costs
(Riahi et al submitted) and avoided damages (Drouet
et al submitted) covered by companion studies.While
exploring the regional details of the investment pat-
terns is beyond the scope of this study, it is clear
that the regional (economic) implications are a very
strong determinant of the political feasibility of
climate mitigation. Globally, increasing investment
volumes related to ambitious near-term mitigation
targets are partly offset by reduced fuel costs (see sup-
plementary figure S11). This is particularly benefi-
cial for fossil fuel importers, which in many cases
will be able to fund the investment requirements (see
supplementary table S2) by the savings from lower
fuel imports. Conversely, current fossil fuel export-
ers in mitigation scenarios face the dual challenge of
reduced fuel export earnings and higher investment
requirements.
5. Conclusions
This study shows that achieving low peak temper-
ature targets requires a shift of energy investments
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in the coming decade, with decisive changes com-
pared to current investment patterns and different
from patterns implied by current policies or the
NDCs submitted currently to the Paris Agreement.
The scenarios show a fundamental reduction in fossil
fuel investments, especially for coal. For oil and
gas, some investments remain but are increasingly
tightened for very low budget targets, and for oil
are limited to existing fields in some 1.5 ◦C scen-
arios. At the same time enhanced investments are
shown for efficiency measures, low-carbon fuels, and
especially low-carbon power generation. While tech-
nology choices differ across models in intermedi-
ate ambition scenarios, 1.5 ◦C scenarios show more
robust patterns, although with considerable variation
of absolute levels. Solar and wind, and power grids
and storage options stand out as requiring the highest
share of near-term investment flows, with invest-
ments being scaled up by up to a factor of 4 compared
to current levels for solar and wind.
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